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INTERVENING CONVICTIONS AS SUPPORT FOR
ENHANCED SENTENCES FOLLOWING APPEAL AND
RETRIAL
Sentencing is a critically important phase of the criminal justice process.'
1. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 150 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(sentencing phase as critical as guilt-innocence phase); see also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,
462-63 (1981) (guilt and penalty phase equally critical for fifth amendment purposes); Mempa
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) (sentencing is critical phase entitling defendant to sixth amendment right to counsel). See generally M. FRANKEL, CRI!IlNAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
vii (1973) (imposition of sentences most critical phase of criminal justice system); Special Project,
Eleventh AnnualReview of CriminalProcedure 1980-81, 70 GEO. L.J. 465, 721 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Criminal Procedure1980-811; Note, Past Arrests and Perceived Perjury as Sentencing
Factorsin Illinois, 13 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 935 (1982) (reviewing sentencing law) [hereinafter cited
as Past Arrests].
The primary purpose of sentencing and incarceration is the rehabilitation of the offender.
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978); see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
247-48 (1949) (rehabilitation of offender important objective of sentencing). The Supreme Court
has stated that the best means to accomplish the objective of rehabilitation is to allow judges
a wide range of discretion to tailor the sentence to fit the offender as well as the offense. Williams,
337 U.S. at 247. To support judges in the task of imposing the appropriate sentence on each
offender, Congress has mandated that judges shall have available the fullest possible information
for consideration in the presentence investigation. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 1001(a),
18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976). In the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Congress provided that
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
shall be available for the court's consideration in imposing a sentence. Id. The presentence report
submitted to the sentencing judge contains background information concerning the defendant.
FED. R. CRim. P. 32(c)(2). Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the report may contain any prior criminal history of the defendant, as well as information about the financial condition, personal characteristics, circumstances affecting his behavior, and other information as required by the court. Id. Moreover, a sentencing judge may consider criminal history other than
convictions. See United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972) (sentencing judge may
consider charges resulting in acquittal of defendant); United States v. Cafarelli, 401 F.2d 512,
514 (2d Cir.) (sentencing judge may consider evidence of crimes for which state did not try defendant), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 987 (1968); United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir.)
(sentencing judge may consider charges dismissed at trial), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
The sentencing judge's inquiry, though broad, is not unlimited in scope. A judge may not
consider false or unreliable information contained in a presentence report. See Townsend v. Burke,
334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948) (Court held trial judge's sentencing procedure violated due process
because judge imposed sentence based on record of eight prior convictions without allowing uncounseled defendant opportunity to object to record's inaccuracy); see also United States v. Weston,
448 F.2d 626, 629-31 (9th Cir. 1971) (court vacated sentence based on unverifiable and unreliable
charges of serious criminal conduct), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972). A judge also may not
consider prior convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel. United States v. Tucker,
404 U.S. 443, 448-49 (1972). But cf. Portillo v. United States, 588 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (Tucker inapplicable when trial court considered prior conviction resulting from fourth
amendment violation in imposing sentence). Moreover, a sentencing judge may not consider information obtained through an illegal warrantless search when imposing a sentence. Verdugo
v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970); see
Armpriester v. United States, 256 F.2d 294, 297 (4th Cir.) (court cannot consider illegally seized
evidence in determining sentence), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 856 (1958). But cf. United States v.
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Although due process2 protections extend to the sentencing procedure, 3 they

have developed more slowly at the sentencing stage than at other stages of
the trial process, preserving the wide discretion traditionally accorded judges
in sentencing decisions." The Supreme Court has determined that due process
requires that vindictiveness toward a defendant for successfully challenging
a prior conviction play no part in the sentencing decision upon retrial and
reconviction. One perceived manifestation of judicial vindictiveness is the imposition of an enhanced sentence upon reconviction. 6 In North Carolina v.
Pearce,7 the Supreme Court formulated a prophylactic rule to ensure that courts
comply with due process standards and that vindictiveness does not influence

a resentencing decision.' The federal circuit courts, however, have applied the
Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 941-42 (9th Cir. 1981) (sentencing judge may consider evidence illegally
seized when illegality caused by technical error in warrant and search not inappropriate).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. The fifth amendment provides that the federal government cannot deprive an individual of constitutional rights without due process of law. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution forbids any state from depriving a
citizen of the United States of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. Due process of law requires that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature
of the case. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
3. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (sentencing process must satisfy requirements of due process clause); see also supra note 2 (due process clause requirements). The
Supreme Court has established guidelines to ensure that defendants receive due process protections at the sentencing stage. Due process entitles a defendant to representation by counsel at
the sentencing hearing, and to have counsel speak on his behalf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,
134 (1967); see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948) (due process violated when defendant lacked counsel to rebut false accusations in presentence report). A defendant has the right
to imposition of a sentence without purposeful or oppressive delay. See Pollard v. United States,
352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957) (sixth amendment guarantee of speedy trial extends to imposition of
sentence). The sentencing court must allow the defendant an opportunity to speak in his own
behalf. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426 (1962). A defendant has the right to be present
during sentencing. United States v. Horton, 646 F.2d 181, 188-89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 970 (1981).
4. See Past Arrests, supra note 1, at 937 n.4 (due process protections at sentencing slow
to develop and remain unsettled).
5. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969); see United States v. Goodwin,
457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) (individual may not be punished for exercising protected statutory or
constitutional right); see also United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (Court declared
that imposition of punishment to penalize those who choose to exercise constitutional rights patently
unconstitutional).
6. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-26 n.20 (1969) (imposition of harsher
sentence to penalize defendants' challenges to original conviction would threaten defendants and
chill exercise of right to appeal); United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968) (prospect of increased sentence threatens defendants' assertion of rights). See generally Van Alstyne,
In Gideon's Wake: HarsherPenalties and the "Successful" CriminalAppellant, 74 YaE L.J.
606 (1965) (discussion of enhancement of penalties following challenge of conviction) [hereinafter
cited as In Gideon's Wake]; Aplin, Sentence Increases on RetrialAfter North Carolina v. Pearce,
39 U. CIN. L. REv. 427 (1970) (discussion of possible perception of vindictiveness in sentence
enhancement after retrial) [hereinafter cited as Sentence Increases].
7. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).

8. See id. at 726. In Pearce, the Supreme Court held that whenever a judge imposes an
enhanced sentence after retrial, the judge must set forth reasons for the enhancement. Id. In
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Pearce Court's guidelines inconsistently in determining what circumstances
justify an enhanced sentence on reconviction. 9
The litigation in Pearce arose when a North Carolina state court convicted the defendant of assault with intent to rape and sentenced him to twelve
to fifteen years imprisonment.10 The defendant appealed his conviction on
the ground that the court had violated his constitutional rights by admitting

an involuntary confession into evidence against him." The North Carolina
Supreme Court reversed his conviction and ordered the lower court to retry
Pearce without evidence of the confession.' 2 After retrial and reconviction,
the same North Carolina state court that heard Pearce's original case imposed
an eight-year term of incarceration.' 3 Because Pearce already had served several
years of his original term, the second sentence actually constituted a harsher
penalty. 4 The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the reconviction and
resentencing on appeal. 5
Pearce initiated a habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District

addition, the Pearce Court stated that a judge must base the reasons for the enhancement upon
specific conduct on the defendant's part occurring after the time of the original sentencing. Id.
Further, the PearceCourt mandated that the judge make the information upon which the judge
based the sentence enhancement part of the trial record so that a reviewing court could examine
the information to determine its validity. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 21-30 (discussion
of Pearce Court's rationale).
9. Compare United States v. Wasman, 700 F.2d 663, 668 (1lth Cir.) (intervening convictions for conduct predating original sentencing sufficient support for enhanced sentence under
Pearce), cert. granted, 104 S.Ct. 334 (1983) with United States v. Williams, 651 F.2d 644, 648
(9th Cir. 1981) (intervening conviction in state court could not support enhanced sentence on
retrial under Pearce)and United States v. Markus, 603 F.2d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1979) (intervening
conviction on charges pending at time of original sentencing not conduct supporting enhanced
sentence under Pearce).
10. State v. Pearce, 266 N.C. 234, 236, 145 S.E.2d 918, 920, aff'd, 268 N.C. 707, 151
S.E.2d 571 (1966).
11. Id. at 237, 145 S.E.2d at 919.
12. Id. at 238, 145 S.E.2d at 921. In Pearce, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed
Pearce's conviction because the trial court admitted evidence of the defendant's statements that
the Supreme Court determined were involuntary and were made without the presence of counsel.
Id. In refusing to admit the defendant's statements, the North Carolina Supreme Court relied
on the Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), which held that
the fourteenth amendment required appointment of counsel to represent defendants incapable
of defending themselves in capital cases. 266 N.C. at 238, 145 S.E.2d at 921. The North Carolina
Supreme Court also relied on State v. Simpson, 243 N.C. 436, 90 S.E.2d 708 (1956), which held
that the North Carolina constitution required appointment of counsel to represent defendants
in capital cases. 266 N.C. at 238, 145 S.E.2d at 921.
13. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713.
14. Id. In Pearce,the Court stated that because the defendant would spend a longer time
in prison under the new sentence than under the original sentence, the new sentence was more
severe. Id. Accordingly, the Pearcerule is implicated if the defendant must spend an increased
time in prison. See id. at 713, 726. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 651 F.2d 644, 647 (9th
Cir. 1981) (court implicated Pearcerule because second sentence increased time defendant served
in prison); United States v. Markus, 603 F.2d 409, 413 (2d Cir. 1979) (actual effect of new sentence
relevant inquiry for determining applicability of Pearce standard).
15. State v. Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 708, 151 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1966).
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Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. 6 The district court granted
the writ," 7 relying on an earlier holding of the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that an enhanced sentence imposed on retrial
was unconstitutional. 8 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's order.19
North Carolina appealed the Fourth Circuit's decision, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether the Constitution limited the imposition

of a harsher sentence upon retrial. 2"

16. See Pearce v. North Carolina, 397 F.2d 253, 253 (4th Cir. 1968).
17. Id.
18. See id. at 253-54. The federal district court in Pearcebased the grant of Pearce's petition for habeas corpus on the Fourth Circuit's prior decision in Patton v. North Carolina, 381
F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968). Id. In Patton, the Fourth Circuit
held that an enhanced sentence on retrial violated the due process, equal protection, and double
jeopardy provisions of the Constitution. 381 F.2d at 646. The litigation in Patton arose when
the defendant petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus after a North Carolina
state court imposed an enhanced sentence following retrial and reconviction for armed robbery.
Id. at 636-37. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant Patton's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that to force an accused to risk increased punishment as
a condition for exercise of a constitutional right violated due process. Id. at 640.
19. Pearce v. North Carolina, 397 F.2d 253, 254 (4th Cir. 1968) (Fourth Circuit held Pearce
strictly governed by holding of Patton); see supra note 18 (discussion of Fourth Circuit's holding
in Patton).
20. North Carolina v. Pearce, 393 U.S. 922 (1968). The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Pearceto resolve the conflicts among federal circuit courts and state courts concerning whether
imposing an enhanced sentence on retrial violated constitutional protections. North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 715 n.5 (1969). Compare Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583, 585
(1st Cir. 1967) (defendant should not have to fear possibility that exercise of right to appeal
will result in penalty in form of higher sentence) and State v. Turner, 247 Or. 301, -,
429
P.2d 565, 571 (1967) (state court's procedural policy should not limit right of appeal by requiring
defendant to risk more severe sentence to exercise right) with Newman v. Rodriguez, 375 F.2d
712, 714 (10th Cir. 1967) (risk of incurring greater prison sentence after retrial is risk defendant
takes when defendant chooses to appeal) and United States ex. rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d
808, 811-12 (3d Cir. 1967) (trial judge may impose sentence greater than originally imposed without
violating due process protection).
Prior to Pearce, the development of a constitutional theory suggesting that the imposition
of a harsher sentence upon retrial might violate due process principles may have originated with
an article by Professor William Van Alstyne entitled In Gideon's Wake: HarsherPenalties and
the "Successful" CriminalAppellant. See In Gideon's Wake supra note 6 (harsher resentencing
for criminal defendants who appeal denies fundamental rights to fair trial and discourages right
to appeal). In United States v. Coke, Judge Friendly attributed the origin of the argument that
the Constitution prohibited the imposition of a harsher sentence upon retrial to the Van Alstyne
article. 404 F.2d 836, 843 (2d Cir. 1968). The Coke court prohibited the imposition of a harsher
sentence upon retrial unless warranted either by the defendant's conduct after the time of the
original sentencing or by new information unrecognized by the sentencing judge at the time of
the first sentencing proceeding. Id. at 845. The Second Circuit formulated the Coke rule prior
to Pearceas an exercise of supervisory powers. Id. at 845-46; see Sentence Increases,supra note
6, at 447-49 (history of development of arguments leading to Pearce decision). Van Alstyne later
proved an effective advocate for his theory that due process prohibited enhancement of sentence
upon retrial. As assigned counsel, he argued against the defendant's increased sentence in Patton
and prevailed, creating the precedent which North Carolina subsequently appealed in Pearce.
See United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d at 843 (discussion of Van Alstyne's representation of Patton); supra note 18 (discussion of Patton court's reasoning).
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Pearce. 21
The Pearce Court held that imposition of heavier sentences on reconvicted
defendants for the purpose of penalizing those who successfully attack prior
convictions would violate the due process guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment.2 2 Accordingly, the Court stated that vindictiveness against a defendant for exercising a right to appeal 23 was not a legitimate basis for the imposition of a second enhanced sentence. 24 The Pearce Court recognized,
however, that a defendant would have difficulty proving a retaliatory motive
on the part of a sentencing judge.2 5 The PearceCourt, therefore, formulated
21. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969).
22. See id. at 724-25. The petitioners in Pearceand the companion case, Simpson v. Rice,
274 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff'd, 396 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1968), aff'd sub nom. North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), argued that the enhanced punishment on retrial violated
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment as binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment, and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 395 U.S. at
719, 722. The litigation in Simpson v. Rice arose when Rice's original conviction and ten-year
sentence were reversed on the ground that Rice had not been accorded his constitutional right
to counsel. Id. at 714. The same court retried and reconvicted Rice, and sentenced him to 25
years in prison. Id. The resentencing judge refused to give the defendant credit for time served
in prison under the original sentence. Id. Rice brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Id. The district court
judge granted Rice's petition, concluding that the State of Alabama imposed the enhanced sentences
to punish the defendant for exercising his post-conviction right of review. Id. at 715. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's judgement, and the State of Alabama appealed to the Supreme
Court. Id.
In Pearce,the Supreme Court rejected the double jeopardy argument, holding that double
jeopardy did not preclude retrying a defendant after an original conviction is set aside because
of error, and that the power to retry the defendant included the power to impose whatever sentence
was legally available. Id. at 720. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution protects individuals from the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once
for the same offense. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957); see Comment, Double
Jeopardy and Post-Verdict Judgements of Acquittal, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 669, 670 (1983)
(double jeopardy principles prohibit government from prosecuting defendant twice for same offense when prosecution failed to obtain conviction in previous trial.) The PearceCourt also rejected the contention that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibited
an increased sentence upon retrial, holding that a state has not classified defendants who receive
enhanced sentences upon retrial, because so many variables affect the outcome of the retrial and
resentencing. 395 U.S. at 722-23. The Court determined, however, that imposition of an enhanced sentence on retrial violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because a
possible perception of a vindictive motive for the increased sentence impermissibly would chill
defendants' exercise of the right to appeal. Id. at 719-24; see infra notes 21-30 and accompanying
text (discussion of Pearce Court's rationale).
23. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724 (defendants' right to appeal must be free and unfettered).
The Constitution does not require that states provide a mechanism for appeal of criminal conviction. Ross v. Moffett, 417 U.S. 600, 606 (1974); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
Once a state establishes review procedures, however, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment protects the free exercise of the statutory right of appeal. Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21, 25 n.4, 28 (1974); see Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1966) (avenues of appellate
review must be equally accessible to all); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956) (state that
grants appellate review cannot provide review so as to discriminate against some defendants).
24. 395 U.S. at 725.
25. Id. at 725 n.20.
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a three-prong rule designed to eliminate prospective appellants' apprehension
that a successful challenge to an original conviction might result in the vindictive imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial.26 First, the PearceCourt mandated that whenever a judge imposes an enhanced sentence upon retrial, the
reasons for the increased sentence must appear in the opinion.27 Second, the
judge must base the reasons for the enhanced sentence on objective information concerning specific, identifiable conduct by the defendant which occurred
after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. 2 8 Third, the resentencing
judge must include the information supporting an enhanced sentence in the
record of the proceeding so that a reviewing court may assess fully the
legitimacy of the enhanced sentence upon appeal. 29 Justice White concurred
in the Court's decision in Pearce, but in a separate opinion suggested that
any objective, identifiable factual data not known to the trial judge at the
time of the original sentencing should support an enhanced sentence upon
retrial.3"
Although the Pearce Court established guidelines to prevent vindictive
resentencing, the Court recognized that the Constitution does not preclude
absolutely the trial judge's imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial.3" The
possibility thus exists that a court may impose increased punishment upon
resentencing after Pearceif vindictiveness is not a factor.3 2 While most courts
have applied the PearceCourt's standards to prohibit the imposition of harsher
26. Id. at 725-26.
27. Id. at 726.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 751 (White, J., concurring in part).
31. Id. at 720, 723. In Pearce, the Court recognized that the government enjoys a wellestablished power to retry a defendant when an appeals court reverses the conviction because
of error. Id. at 720; see United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964) (double jeopardy imposes no limitation on government's power to retry defendant when appellate court sets aside
conviction because of error). The PearceCourt further noted that historically the power to retry
a defendant after reversal of his conviction on grounds of error included the power to impose
whatever sentence was appropriate at retrial, without reference to the original punishment. 395
U.S. at 720. Accordingly, the PearceCourt explicitly refused to overrule the broad judicial power
to set sentences that the Court established in Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919). Id.
Stroud involved a challenge to a death sentence imposed on retrial after reversal of the original
conviction and sentence of life imprisonment. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 17 (1919).
The defendant in Stroud claimed that imposition of the enhanced sentence violated the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (double jeopardy clause
of fifth amendment prohibits federal government from subjecting individuals more than once
to trial for same offense); supra note 22 (discussion of double jeopardy protection). The Court,
however, rejected the defendant's challenge, holding that a sentencing judge has the power to
impose at retrial any sentence authorized by statute. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919).
32. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 28 (1973) (enhanced sentence imposed by
jury after reconviction permissible under Pearce because jury resentencing bears no inherent
likelihood of vindictiveness); infra note 65 (discussion of Chaffin Court's reasoning); see also
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (enhanced sentence imposed after trial de novo
permissible under Pearce because no inherent risk of vindictiveness exists in de novo trial process); infra note 64 (discussion of Colten Court's reasoning).
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sentences on retrial,3 3 a minority of courts have imposed enhanced sentences
that the courts claim are consistent with the Pearce rule. 4 Inconsistent applications of the Pearce Court's prophylactic rule result from differing interpretations of the Pearcerule, which restricts the bases for an enhanced sentence
to information concerning conduct occurring after the original sentencing
proceeding. 5 When the conduct in question is unrelated criminal activity oc33. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 419 F.2d 753, 754-55 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam)
(remanded for resentencing in light of Pearce because trial court failed to state valid reason for
enhanced sentence); United States v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th Cir. 1969) (remanded for
resentencing because trial court did not affirmatively show reasons for enhanced sentence), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1013 (1970); United States v. King, 415 F.2d 737, 740 (6th Cir.) (remanded
for resentencing because district court did not state reason for imposition of more severe sentence),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 974 (1969); United States v. Wood, 413 F.2d 437, 438 (5th Cir.) (enhanced
sentence vacated under Pearcebecause record silent on reasons for harsher penalty), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 925 (1969); Stonom v. Wainwright, 235 So.2d 545, 547 (Fla. App. 1970) (sentence reduced
to length of original sentence because no reasons or data supporting more severe sentence presented);
State v. Shak, 51 Hawaii 626, -,
466 P.2d 420, 421 (original sentence reimposed because no
data in record concerning identifiable conduct on defendant's part as required by Pearce, cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970); People v. Smith, 44 Ill. 2d 272, 277, 255 N.E.2d 450, 452 (1970)
(remanded for hearing on justification for enhanced sentence because no reasons existed for more
severe penalty); People v. Baze, 43 Ill. 2d 298, 305, 253 N.E.2d 392, 395 (1969) (sentence vacated
because no conduct on defendant's part supported enhanced sentence as required by Pearce);
State v. Pilcher, 171 N.W.2d 251, 254-55 (Iowa 1969) (sentence reduced to length of original
term because no basis for enhanced sentence presented). But see United States v. Wasman, 700
F.2d 663, 669-70 (11th Cir.) (enhanced sentence on retrial upheld because Pearce rule inapplicable
to circumstances of resentencing), cert. granted, 104 S.Ct. 334 (1983); infra notes 49-69 and accompanying text (discussion of Wasman court's reasoning); see also infra note 35 (discussion
of cases upholding enhanced sentences after Pearce).
34. See United States v. Wasman, 700 F.2d 663, 670 (11th Cir.) (upholding enhanced sentence
on retrial based on intervening conviction), cert. granted, 104 S.Ct. 334 (1983); cf. United States
v. Kienlen, 415 F.2d 557, 559-60 (10th Cir. 1969) (court held defendant's retrial testimony indicating "brutal nature" of defendant was sufficient conduct to justify enhanced sentence).
35. Courts have reached different conclusions on the question of whether conduct supporting an enhanced sentence must have occurred after the original sentencing proceeding to satisfy
the Pearce rule. See Robinson v. Scully, 690 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1982) (new information exposing defendant's greater culpability will not support harsher sentence if information relates to
activities predating original sentence); United States v. Williams, 651 F.2d 644, 648 (9th Cir.
1981) (court reversed enhanced sentence on grounds that intervening conviction based on activities occurring before original sentencing not valid basis for sentence enhancement under Pearce
rule); United States v. Markus, 603 F.2d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1979) (intervening conviction based
upon indictment pending at time of original sentencing fails to satisfy Pearcerule). But see United
States v. Wasman, 700 F.2d 663, 670 (11th Cir.) (intervening conviction for conduct predating
original sentencing sufficient conduct to justify enhanced sentence under Pearce), cert. granted,
104 S.Ct. 334 (1983). Similarly, courts have interpreted the Pearcerule to include different types
of conduct as supporting an enhanced sentence on retrial. Compare United States v. Kienlen,
415 F.2d 557, 559-60 (10th Cir. 1969) (court held that defendant's retrial testimony indicating
"brutal nature" of defendant was sufficient conduct to justify enhanced sentence) and People
v. Bernette, 45 I11. 2d 227, 239, 258 N.E.2d 793, 799 (1970) (court held that defendant's testimony
at second trial was sufficient conduct under Pearceto justify enhanced sentence since testimony
revealed details of crime, rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) with United States v.
Lopez, 428 F.2d 1135, 1139 (2d. Cir. 1970) (increase in defendant's net worth between trials
not sufficient conduct to justify increased fine under Pearce) and United States v. Gross, 416
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curring before the original trial but resulting in a conviction only after the
first sentencing proceeding, the federal circuit courts have reached different
conclusions on whether the conduct can support imposition of an enhanced
sentence. 6 In the most recent application of the Pearce rule, the Eleventh
Circuit departed from established precedent by allowing an intervening conviction for conduct predating the original sentencing to support imposition
37
of an increased punishment after reconviction.
In United States v. Wasman,38 a jury convicted Milton Wasman of making
false statements in a passport application. 39 The judge for the United States
District Court of the Southern District of Florida subsequently sentenced
Wasman to two years imprisonment, with all but six months suspended and
three years probation substituted."0 On appeal, Wasman contended that the

judge's refusal to admit certain evidence of his motive constituted reversible
error.' The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence was admissible
as indicative of circumstances
surrounding Wasman's defense, and remanded
42
the case for a new trial.
F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th Cir. 1969) (court reversed sentence because trial court did not cite conduct
to justify enhancement), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1013 (1970).
36. Compare United States v. Wasman, 700 F.2d 663, 668 (1lth Cir,) (court determined
that enhanced sentence based on intervening conviction was consistent with Pearce), cert. granted,
104 S.Ct. 334 (1983) with United States v. Williams, 651 F.2d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1981) (intervening conviction did not justify enhanced sentence under Pearce) and United States v. Markus,
603 F.2d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1979) (intervening conviction did not justify enhanced sentence under
Pearce).
37. See United States v. Wasman, 700 F.2d 663, 668 (11th Cir.) (court determined that
enhanced sentence based on intervening conviction was consistent with Pearce), cert. granted,
104 S.Ct. 334 (1983).
38. 700 F.2d 663 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S.Ct. 334 (1983).
39. Id. at 664-65; see 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (1976) (felony to make knowingly and willfully
false statement in order to secure United States' passport). In Wasman, the government's evidence
at trial showed that Milton Wasman, a Florida attorney, applied for and received a passport
in the name of David Hendrick, a deceased law school classmate. United States v. Wasman,
484 F. Supp. 54, 56 (S.D. Fla. 1979), rev'd, 641 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981). Wasman admitted
applying for the passport under the assumed name, but attempted to introduce evidence to show
that his purpose in adopting the new name was not fraudulent. See id. at 57 (Wasman claimed
reason for adopting false name was to employ non-Semitic name in business dealings with Arab
investors); see also infra note 42 (discussion of evidentiary issue concerning Wasman's motive
for adopting false name). Wasman contended that common-law principles allowed anyone to
assume a new name so long as the person did not have any fraudulent intent. 484 F. Supp. at
57; see United States v. Cox, 593 F.2d 46, 48 (6th Cir. 1979) (common law allows an individual
to adopt any name without any legal proceedings provided assumption of new name is not for
fraudulent purposes). The district court judge excluded the proffered evidence of motive as irrelevant. 484 F. Supp. at 56-58.
40. 700 F.2d at 665; see United States v. Wasman, 484 F. Supp. 54 (S.D. Fla. 1979) rev'd,
641 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981).
41. United States v. Wasman, 641 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1981).
42. Id. at 330. In Wasman, the Fifth Circuit stated that if Wasman had evidence tending
to show that he legally had assumed a different name, that evidence would be relevant to establish
a valid defense to the charge of falsely stating his name in the application for a passport. Id.
at 329. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged in Wasman that a trial judge has wide discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is relevant. Id. The Wasman court determined that the evidence
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On remand, the jury convicted Wasman a second time.4 3 The same district
court judge presided at the second trial and set a new sentence of two years
confinement. 4 The judge attributed the enhanced sentence to Wasman's intervening conviction after a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of possessing
counterfeit certificates of deposit. 5 The sentencing judge was aware that charges
were pending on a separate indictment for mail fraud at the time of the first
trial." In accordance with his own policy and at the express request of the
defendant, however, the judge did not consider the pending charges when imposing the original sentence. 7 Wasman appealed the second conviction,
asserting that the enhancement of the sentence on retrial violated the due process protections established in Pearce."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed both the second conviction and
the enhanced sentence. 9 The Wasman court reasoned that the district court
had complied with the requirements of the Pearce rule by stating the reasons
rejected by the trial court did not go solely to motive, but rather dealt with whether the statement
of the name was false. Id. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, found that the trial court in Wasman
abused its discretion by excluding the proffered evidence and reversed and remanded the case
for a new trial. Id. at 329-30.
The evidence excluded by the trial court was Wasman's testimony that he obtained a passport
in a different name on the advice of real estate dealers who represented Arabs interested in investing in South Florida property. 700 F.2d at 665. The real estate dealer allegedly counselled
Wasman to use a non-Semitic name in transactions with the Arab clients. Id. On remand, the
district court followed the Fifth Circuit's decision in Wasman, and admitted the evidence at issue.
Id. To rebut Wasman's testimony that he legitimately assumed the new name, however, the government offered evidence showing that Wasman continued to use his own name in other dealings
after obtaining the false passport. Id.
43. 700 F.2d at 665.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 667. In Wasman, at the time of the defendant's first trial on the charges of
making a false statement to obtain a passport, Wasman also was under indictment for mail fraud
in connection with a plan to finance real estate developments. Transcript of hearing, Supplemental Record on Appeal, Appendix to Appellant's Brief, United States v. Wasman, 700 F.2d 663
(IIth Cir. 1983). The government dismissed the indictment for mail fraud in return for Wasman's
plea of nolo contendere to a charge of possession of false certificates of deposit. Id.; see 18
U.S.C. § 480 (1976) (felony to possess false or forged obligations or securities issued on foreign
bank).
47. 700 F.2d at 667, 670.
48. Id. at 666; see supra note 8 (specific provisions of Pearcerule); supra notes 26-29 and
accompanying text (discussion of PearceCourt's prophylactic rule). In Wasman, the defendant
advanced two arguments for reversal in addition to his claim that the enhanced sentence on retrial
violated the Pearcedue process standard. 700 F.2d at 665. Wasman contended that the trial judge
erred by excluding evidence that Wasman attempted to introduce at retrial in order to show that
his continued use of his own name after issuance of the false passport was not indicative of
a fraudulent intent with regard to the passport. Id. Wasman also claimed that comments made
by the trial judge reflected the judge's bias against Wasman, thus entitling Wasman to a new
trial before a different judge. Id. The Eleventh Circuit, however, rejected both of Wasman's
claims. Id. at 666. First, the Wasman court held that the trial judge's exclusion of the proffered
evidence, if any error existed, was harmless error. Id. Second, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
Wasman's claim of bias as totally without merit. Id.
49. 700 F.2d at 670.
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for increasing the sentence on the record.5 0 Further, the Wasman court noted
that the intervening conviction for possession of counterfeit certificates of
deposit provided an objective basis for the district court's imposition of the
enhanced sentence.I' Since the sentencing judge had not considered the pending
charges in the imposition of the first sentence, the Wasman court concluded
that the judge correctly considered the conviction when imposing the second
sentence. 2
In affirming the district court's enhanced sentence, the Eleventh Circuit
in Wasman focused on the possibility of actual vindictiveness toward a defendant for exercising the defendant's right to appea 5 3 as the motivation for the
Supreme Court's rule in Pearce." Equally compelling to the Pearce Court,
however, was the concern that a perception of possible vindictiveness resulting
in harsher sentences upon retrial might deter defendants from pursuing a valid
avenue of appeal.5 The Eleventh Circuit identified the Pearcerule as the means
to avoid judicial vindictiveness and its inhibiting potential.5 6 Consequently,
the Wasman court reasoned that compliance with the Pearce rule, which
requires that the reasons for an enhanced sentence appear on the trial record,
removed any possibility of vindictiveness. 5 ' The Eleventh Circuit emphasized
that the absence of any specified factual basis for the enhanced sentence in
:Pearce led to the reversal of Pearce's second sentence."' Accordingly, the
50. Id. at 666-68; see infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (Wasman court stated that
trial judge eliminated hazard of vindictiveness by offering reasons for enhancement of sentence
upon retrial). But see infra notes 113-16 and 127-35 and accompanying text (Wasman court incorrectly applied Pearce rule).
51. 700 F.2d at 667.
52. Id. at 669-70.
53. See supra note 23 (due process protects statutory right to appeal once state establishes
procedures for appeal).
54. See 700 F.2d at 666-69 (Wasman court's interpretation of Pearce Court's purpose in
establishing the Pearce rule). But see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724-26, 725 n.20
(PearceCourt formulated prophylactic rule to eliminate chilling effect of possibility of vindictiveness because actual vindictive motive difficult for defendants to prove); see also supra text
accompanying notes 25-26 (discussion of PearceCourt's rationale in formulating prophylactic rule).
55. See 395 U.S. at 725, 725 n.20; cf. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974) (Blackledge
Court stated that application of Pearcerule not dependent on existence of actual retaliatory motive).
The Blackledge Court determined that a fear of vindictiveness was sufficient to present an unconstitutional deterrent to a defendant's exercise of his right to appeal. Id.; see infra note 67
(discussion of Blackledge Court's reasoning).
56. 700 F.2d at 666. But cf. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974). The Blackledge
Court noted that although the purpose of the Pearcerule was to eliminate any motive for retaliation toward a defendant who appealed a prior conviction, the rule actually removed only a court's
ability to penalize a defendant who challenged his original conviction and sentence. Id. A defendant, therefore, need not fear the imposition of an enhanced sentence as a penalty for challenging
a prior conviction because the Pearcerule limits the resentencing judge's ability to impose a harsher
penalty. Id.
57. 700 F.2d at 667-68.
58. Id. at 668 n.6. The Wasman court stated that Pearcecannot preclude basing an enhanced
sentence on an intervening conviction because, in Pearce, North Carolina presented no reasons
for the enhanced sentence on retrial. Id. The Pearce C6urt, thus, never addressed the issue of
whether an intervening conviction could support an increased sentence on retrial. See id. The
Wasman Court, thus, declined to apply the Pearcerule to the facts of the Wasman resentencing. Id.
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Wasman court held that no threat of vindictiveness existed if a sentencing
judge documented reasons for the increased second sentence. 9
The Wasman court supported its narrow interpretation of Pearceby tracing
subsequent Supreme Court applications of the Pearceprophylactic rule.60 The
Eleventh Circuit first pointed to the Supreme Court's language in Moon v.
Maryland.6 In Moon, the petitioner claimed that the imposition of an enhanced
sentence after reconviction did not comply with the due process protections
established in Pearce.62 The Supreme Court, however, declined to scrutinize
Moon's due process claim because Moon did not allege that his increased
sentence resulted from actual vindictiveness.63 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit
asserted that subsequent Supreme Court opinions holding the Pearceguidelines
inapplicable to enhanced sentences imposed on trial de novo 64 and by juries65
59. Id. at 669.
60. Id. at 668-69.
61. 398 U.S. 319 (1970) (per curiam); see 700 F.2d at 668.
62. 398 U.S. at 320. The Supreme Court originally granted certiorari in Moon to hear

arguments on whether to apply the Pearce rule retroactively. Id. The Court reconsidered the
grant of certiorari before hearing arguments and dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.
Id. The Moon Court stated that the reason for dismissal was the absence of any allegation on
Moon's part that his enhanced sentence was the result of judicial vindictiveness. Id.
63. Id.; see supra note 62 (discussion of Court's dismissal of Moon without hearing
arguments).
64. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). In Colten, the Court addressed the question
whether a retrial obtained as an exercise of a statutory right to a trial de novo under a two-tier
system should be subject to the Pearceresentencing strictures. Id. at 105-06. Under the Kentucky
system, a defendant may apply for a trial de novo in a court of general criminal jurisdiction
if convicted in an inferior court after a trial or a guilty plea. Id. at 112-13; see Ky. Rev. Stat.

§ 23A.080 (1976 & Supp. 1980) (defendant may apply for trial de novo after conviction or guilty
plea in inferior court). The defendant need not allege error in the lower court proceeding. 407
U.S. at 112-13. The litigation in Coten arose when the defendant refused to leave a gathering
of student protesters after a police officer ordered the group to disperse. Id. at 106-07. The Kentucky inferior court convicted Colten of disorderly conduct and fined him $10.00. Id. at 108.
At the de novo proceeding, the Kentucky court of general jurisdiction reconvicted Colten and
fined him $50.00. Id. Colten appealed to the state appellate court, claiming that the increased
fine violated the Pearcerule. Id. The appellate court affirmed the reconviction and the enhanced
fine, and Colten appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. The Colten Court held that the hazard
of vindictiveness which was present in Pearce did not inhere in the de novo trial proceeding,
since the Colten retrial procedure was distinguishable from the procedure in Pearce. Id. at 116.
For example, the court that conducted the trial de novo and imposed the second and higher
sentence in Colten was a different court from the one that conducted the original trial. Id. at
116-17. The de novo proceeding followed in Colten involved no assignment of error to the original
court. Id. at 117. Further, the defendant in Colten presented no reason or motivation for the
de novo court to deal more harshly in imposing sentence than did the trial court. Id. Consequently,
the Colten Court refused to apply the Pearce guidelines to the sentencing process following a
trial de novo. Id. at 118. See generally Note, Increased Sentences on an Appeal by Right from
Inferior Courts, 51 N.C. L. REv. 882 (1973) (discussion of Colten reasoning).
65. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). In Chaffin, the Court refused to apply
the Pearce guidelines to resentencing by a jury, because the Court found no inherent vindictiveness in a jury sentencing system. Id. at 28. Accordingly, the Chaffin Court distinguished the
jury sentencing process from the imposition of a second sentence by a judge in several respects.
Id. at 27. For example, the Chaffin Court stated that a resentencing jury would have no knowledge
of the first sentence imposed. Id. The Court referred to knowledge of the prior sentence as the
first prerequisite for imposition of a retaliatory penalty. Id. at 26. Moreover, the jury setting
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further supported restricting the scope of the Pearce rule to cases of actual
vindictiveness.1 The Wasman court stated that the Supreme Court's later application of the Pearce rule to actions by a state prosecutor resulting in an
enhanced sentence upon retrial focused on the possibility of a vindictive motive
for the prosecutor's actions.6 7 After analyzing the Supreme Court's application of the Pearce rule, the Wasman court stated that due process forbids
6
only those enhanced sentences that pose a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness. 1
The Wasman court, therefore, maintained that an increased sentence does not
establishes
offend the due process protection established in Pearceif the record
9
a total absence of any realistic likelihood of vindictiveness."
Although the Eleventh Circuit in Wasman allowed the imposition of an
enhanced sentence upon retrial, two other circuit courts have rejected increased
sentences in cases with facts similar to those in Wasman.7 0 In United States
the sentence at retrial was not the judicial entity reversed on appeal so that the jury had no
interest in having the prior conviction and sentence reimposed or enhanced. Id. at 27. In addition, the Chaffin Court stated that a jury would not be motivated by the institutional interests
that might prompt a judge to impose harsher sentences in order to discourage what the judge
regarded as meritless appeals that increase the judge's caseload. Id. at 27; cf. Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) (Court stated that result in Chaffin might have differed if jury had known
of prior sentence). See generally Note, Limitations on Sentencing after Reconviction by Jury,
87 HAiv. L. REv. 233 (1973) (Chaffin holding does not bar reversal of enhanced sentence imposed
by jury if plaintiff demonstrates actual vindictive motive).
66. 700 F.2d at 668-69. The Wasman court relied on Colten and Chaffin for the proposition that actual vindictiveness must be present to apply the Pearcerule. Id.; see supra notes 64-65
(Court found no inherent likelihood of vindictiveness in procedures used to resentence defendants in Colten and Chaffin). But see infra text accompanying notes 119-26 (Wasman court erred
in relying on Chaffin and Colten to support decision not to apply Pearce rule to Wasman's enhanced
sentence).
67. 700 F.2d at 669. The Wasman court relied upon the Court's decision in Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), as support for the proposition that the Pearcerule was not applicable
to Wasman's enhanced sentence absent any realistic likelihood of vindictiveness. 700 F.2d at 669.
Blackledge involved a defendant, convicted of misdemeanor assault, who exercised his statutory
right to trial de novo. 417 U.S. at 23. After the defendant filed his appeal for a de novo hearing,
the prosecutor obtained a felony indictment for the same conduct. Id. The defendant pleaded
guilty to the second indictment but on petition for habeas corpus claimed a violation of Pearce's
due process protections. Id. at 25. The Blackledge Court applied the principles enunciated in
the Pearce decision to the prosecutor's action to determine if an inherent likelihood of vindictiveness existed in the decision to seek conviction on the felony charge at the de novo trial. Id.
at 27. The Blackledge Court stated that the defendants could perceive a vindictive motive in the
prosecutor's action because a prosecutor has a stake in discouraging convicted defendants from
appealing. Id. The Court, thus, determined that allowing the prosecutor to opt for a higher charge
on retrial might dcter defendants from exercising their right to appeal. Id. at 28-29. Consequently, the Blackledge Court affirmed the grant of defendant's petition for habeas corpus. Id. at
3 1. See generally Note, Protection of Defendants Against ProsecutorialVindictiveness, 54 N.C.
L. REv. 108 (1975) (discussion of adversary process and prosecutorial vindictiveness).
68. 700 F.2d at 669.
69. Id.
70. See United States v. Williams, 651 F.2d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1981) (intervening conviction
held not to support enhanced sentence on reconviction under Pearce); United States v. Markus,
603 F.2d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1979) (intervening conviction held not to support enhanced sentence
on reconviction under Pearce).
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v. Markus,71 for example, the Second Circuit invalidated a second sentence
which effectively increased the total time the defendant would have spent in
prison over that imposed by the original sentence.7 In Markus, five federal

district courts imposed sentences of varying terms on the defendant for convictions on different charges." All of the sentences were to run concurrently

with the exception of those imposed by the Southern District of New York.74

The Southern District of New York sentenced the defendant on two

indictments. 75 A five-year sentence on one indictment was to run consecutively to a ten-year term on the other. 76 The cumulative effect of the fifteen-

year sentence subsumed completely the sentences imposed by the other four
courts. 77 The defendant appealed the conviction on one charge and the accompanying ten-year sentence, and the original sentencing judge in the district
court vacated the conviction."8 A second judge resentenced the defendant after
71. 603 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1979).

72. Id.
73. Id. at 411. In Markus, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York indicted Markus on April 11, 1975, on three counts charging possession and sale of
counterfeit Treasury Bills. Id. at 410; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 472, & 473 (1976) (felony to defraud
United States by selling or passing counterfeit securities of the United States). On October 2,
1975, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana indicted Markus for
conspiring to make false statements to a bank. 603 F.2d at 410; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 1014 (1976)
(felony to make false statements to federal bank). The Louisiana court transferred the indictment
to the Southern District of New York in January 1976. 603 F.2d at 410.
On April 30, 1976, Judge Werker of the Southern District of New York sentenced Markus
to a total of fifteen years' imprisonment on all counts. Id. at 411. The sentences were to run
concurrently with a five-year term imposed in the United States District Court of New Jersey
on April 26, 1976 for securities fraud. Id. On October 22, 1976, the District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky sentenced Markus to a four-year term for making false statements to a bank
that was to run concurrently with the New Jersey and New York sentences. Id.; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1014 (felony to make false statements to a federal bank). On December 8, 1976, the Eastern
District of Louisiana sentenced Markus to a five-year term for interstate transportation of forged
securities to run concurrently with the other sentences. 603 F.2d at 411. On March 29, 1977,
the Northern District of Ohio imposed a two-year term for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 to
run concurrently with the other sentences. Id. The effect of the five sentencing schemes was to
sentence Markus to fifteen years imprisonment. See infra note 76 (discussion of Markus' sentences).
74. 603 F.2d at 411.
75. Id. at 410-1 1; see supra note 73 (sentences Markus received from federal district courts).
76. 603 F.2d at 410-11; see supra note 73 (sentences Markus received from federal district
courts). In Markus, Judge Werker in effect sentenced Markus to ten years imprisonment on the
counts contained in the April 11, 1975 indictment. 603 F.2d at 410-11. Judge Werker imposed
a five-year term on one count of the indictment that was to run concurrently with a ten-year
term on another count. Id. The effective sentence on the counts contained in the October 2,
1975 indictment transferred from Louisiana was a term of five years that was to run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the April 1975 indictment. Id. Judge Werker imposed a fiveyear term on one count that was to run concurrently with sentences of one year on each of three
other counts. Id. at 411. Thus, the total of the sentences imposed by the New York court was
fifteen years. Id.
77. 603 F.2d at 411; see supra note 73 (procedure of Markus' indictments).
78. 603 F.2d at 411. On February 19, 1976, the defendant in Markus pleaded guilty to
all counts of both indictments in the Southern District of New York. Id.; see supra note 73 (procedure of Markus' indictments). On March 14, 1978, Markus filed a motion to vacate the convic-
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a guilty plea to a modified indictment 9 and imposed a five-year term to run
consecutively to the other terms then being served by the defendant." The
result of the resentencing was to increase the total time the defendant would
serve in prison by approximately seven months.8 Markus appealed the resentenclaiming that the enhanced sentence was impercing to the Second Circuit,
82
missible under Pearce.
On appeal, the Second Circuit in Markus determined that the second
sentence received by the defendant increased the total amount of punishment
imposed, even though the second sentence was shorter than the first sentence. 83
The Markus court noted that when the judge imposed the first sentences of
five and ten years, the defendant had pleaded guilty to the two indictments
4
as charged and also had received a five-year sentence in another jurisdiction.
Between the time the district court imposed the first sentences and the time
the same court vacated the ten-year sentence, a Louisiana federal district court
convicted and sentenced Markus to an additional five-year concurrent term.8 5
When the New York district court vacated the ten-year sentence, the cumulative
sentences no longer totally subsumed the Louisiana district court's sentence. 8 6
The new sentence imposed to run consecutively to all other terms thus increased the total time of Markus' incarceration. 7 The Second Circuit reasoned
that the increased sentence was impermissible under Pearcesince the intervention on both indictments. 603 F.2d at 411. Markus claimed that he had no knowledge that the
Treasury Bills he passed were counterfeit, but rather he believed that the bills were stolen. Id.
Judge Werker upheld Markus' motion to vacate the convictions, ruling that the record showed
no evidence that the defendant knew the bills were counterfeit. Id.
79. 603 F.2d at 411. On August 25, 1978, the government filed a modified information
charging Markus with conspiracy to sell purportedly stolen Treasury Bills. Id.; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1982) (felony to conspire to defraud the United States). Markus pleaded guilty to the
modified charge, and on September 12, 1978, Judge Weinfeld of the District Court of the Eastern
District of New York sentenced Markus to a five-year term that was to run consecutive to the
other sentences then being served by the defendant. Id.; see supra note 73 (discussion of other
sentences imposed on Markus).
80. 603 F.2d at 411.
81. Id. at 414; see supra note 14 (effect of sentence on defendant relevant inquiry for determining applicability of Pearce standard).
82. 603 F.2d at 412.
83. Id. at 413; see supra note 14 (effect of sentence on defendant relevant inquiry for determining applicability of Pearce standard).
84. 603 F.2d at 411.
85. Id.; see supranote 73 (discussion of other sentences imposed). In Markus, the sentence
imposed by the Eas-ern District of Louisiana on December 8, 1976 was the relevant sentence
in the defendant's appeal, since the sentence began to run seven months after the New York
court imposed the sentences of five and ten years. 602 F.2d at 413-14. Thus, the Louisiana sentence,
originally subsumed by the New York sentences, was the longest sentence Markus had to serve
once the New York court vacated the original sentences. Id. When Judge Weinfeld imposed the
new five-year term after Markus' guilty plea to the modified charge to run consecutive to the
other sentences being served, the judge increased the total time Markus was to spend in jail by
approximately seven months. Id. at 414. Consequently, the sentence imposed by Judge Weinfeld
effectively enhanced the original sentence imposed by the New York District Court. Id.
86. 603 F.2d at 413-14.
87. Id. at 414; see supra note 85 (discussion of cumulative effect of sentences).
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ing conviction resulted from indictments pending at the time of the original
sentencing for conduct predating that sentencing.8 8 The Markus court held

that such an intervening conviction did not comply with the Pearce Court's
definition of identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after
the original sentencing proceeding. 89

Similarly, in United States v. Williams,9" the Ninth Circuit followed the

Markus court's reasoning in holding that an intervening conviction could not

justify a sentence imposed on retrial that in effect would increase the time
the defendant would have to spend in prison.9' A federal jury convicted
Williams of bank robbery and the District Court for the Southern District
of California imposed a twenty-year sentence after a complete presentence
investigation which revealed that the defendant was under investigation for
93
murder. 92 Williams appealed the bank robbery conviction to the Ninth Circuit.
While the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, a California state court convicted Williams for the murder to which the presentence report had referred. 9

The state court judge sentenced Williams to serve a life term concurrently
with the bank robbery sentence. 95 The Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed

Williams' conviction on the bank robbery charges 96 and remanded the case
for a new trial. 97 The jury reconvicted Williams, and the same federal court
judge imposed a ten-year sentence to run consecutively to the life term for
murder. 98 Williams appealed the second sentence as an unconstitutionally
enhanced sentence under the Pearce rule. 99
88. 603 F.2d at 414.
89. Id.
90. 651 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1981).
91. Id. at 647-48.
92. Id. at 646; see supra note I (presentence report may include defendant's suspected criminal
activity).
93. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979).
94. 651 F.2d at 646.
95. Id.
96. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979). In Williams, the defendant
made a motion for substitution of another appointed counsel on the grounds that an irreconcilable conflict existed between the defendant and his appointed counsel. Id. at 1259-60. The
trial judge, however, denied Williams' request for a substitute counsel, and Williams chose to
represent himself at trial. Id. at 1260. On appeal, the Williams court found that the defendant
had made a sufficient showing of irreconcilable conflict. Id. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, held
that the trial judge's denial of the motion for substituted counsel, under the circumstances, denied
the defendant effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment, and reversed
Williams' bank robbery conviction. Id. at 1260-61. The sixth amendment to the Constitution
guarantees that every defendant in a criminal trial in a federal court shall enjoy the assistance
of counsel for his defense. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
97. 594 F.2d at 1261.
98. 651 F.2d at 646.
99. See id. In Williams, the defendant contended that the imposition of the second ten-year
term, though shorter than the original sentence of twenty years, would result in an unconstitutionally enhanced sentence under the Pearcerule. Id. The defendant in Williams demonstrated
the effect of the second sentence by calculating the shortest period of imprisonment he must
serve under both the original and the enhanced sentence. Id. Under federal statute, Williams
would have been eligible for parole after serving one-third of his original twenty-year sentence,
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit in Williams followed the Markus court's
rationale and determined that the cumulative effect of the resentencing was
to increase the length of Williams' incarceration.' 0 Consequently, the Williams
court held that the indictment and conviction occurring after the first sentence
could not justify an increased sentence under the Pearce Court's clear
language.' 0 ' The Williams court then stated that under the Pearce rule only
conduct on the defendant's part occurring after the original sentencing proceeding could support an enhanced sentence.' 2 The court further stated that
conviction did not constitute conduct under the PearceCourt's
an intervening
0 3
definition.
In refusing to permit the enhanced sentences imposed on retrial, the Markus
and Williams courts applied the Pearce rule consistently with the PearceCourt's
objective of eliminating the potential chilling effect that a fear of vindictiveness
would have on defendants' exercise of the right to appeal. 0 4 The Supreme
Court did not premise the decision in Pearce upon an allegation of actual
judicial hostility toward a defendant who successfully attacked an original
conviction.' 5 Rather, the possibility that the practice of allowing enhanced
sentences on reconviction might deter a defendant with a valid claim of error
or unconstitutional procedure from exercising a right to appeal prompted the
formulation of the prophylactic rule.'0 6 Both the Williams and Markus courts
perceived the risk of vindictiveness on the part of the resentencing judge as
identical to the risk the Supreme Court identified in Pearce, because no identifiable conduct by the defendants supported the increased sentence.' 7 Similarly,
the Wasman court did not point to any conduct by the defendants occurring
after the original sentencing that could support the imposition of a harsher
penalty after retrial.'
or six years and eight months. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1982). Before the federal court decided
Williams' appeal on the bank robbery conviction, a California state court convicted him of first
degree murder and imposed a life sentence to run concurrently with the twenty-year federal sentence.
651 F.2d at 646. Under the relevant California statute, Williams was eligible for parole after
seven years. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 3046 (Deering 1983) (parole board shall review prisoner
sentenced to life imprisonment to determine suitability for parole after seven years). Thus, the
shortest term Williams must have served on the concurrent sentences was seven years. 651 F.2d
at 646. After resentencing, however, Williams would have to serve the minimum of one-third
the new federal sentence of ten years, or three years and four months. Id. Williams, therefore,
had to serve a minimum of ten years and four months under the district court's resentencing
plan. Id.
100. Id. at 647; see supra text accompanying notes 83, 88-89 (rationale of Markus court).
101. Id. at 648.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See 395 U.S. at 725-26.
105. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974) (no allegation of actual malice present
in Pearce or Blackledge); see also supra text accompanying notes 25-26 (Pearcerule formulated
to eliminate defendants' apprehension of vindictive resentencing).
106. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
107. See 651 F.2d at 648 (risk of vindictiveness in Williams identical to that in Pearce);
603 F.2d at 414 (no conduct existed to support imposition of enhanced sentence under Pearce).
108. See 700 F.2d at 667-68 (Pearcedoes not limit enhanced sentences to instances where
defendant has committed an offense after the first trial).
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The Wasman court, nevertheless, refused to apply the Markus and Williams
holdings, reasoning that the Markus and Williams courts implemented the
Pearce rule without regard to whether the circumstances of the resentencing
presented any risk of vindictiveness.' 9 The Wasman-court further observed
that to adopt the procedure required by Pearce in the absence of any risk
of vindictiveness unnecessarily would remove valid information from the sentencing judge's considerations in setting punishment." 0I The Wasman court concluded that since the resentencing judge offered reasons to support the enhanced
sentence, no risk of vindictiveness existed"' and consequently the Pearce
2
resentencing restrictions did not apply."
Although the Wasman court refused to follow the Markus and Williams
holdings, the Markus and Williams cases are more relevant to the issues
presented in Wasman than are the Supreme Court cases the Eleventh Circuit
cited in support of its position." 3 The fact patterns of both Markus and
Williams involved the precise question of whether an intervening conviction
for unrelated criminal conduct could satisfy the requirements of the Pearce
rule." 4 In Wasman, as in Markus and Williams, the sentencing judge knew
of the pending charges at the time the judge imposed the original sentence. " 5
The Wasman court acknowledged that an appellate court might have difficulty
ascertaining whether the intervening conduct was an aggravating factor in imposing the first sentence, because the sentencing judge knew of the conduct
at the first proceeding and because pending charges are a valid factor for a
judge to consider in imposing sentence." 6 The Markus and Williams courts,
'in evaluating fact patterns similar to those presented in Wasman, held that
.the enhanced sentences could not stand because the resentencing judge imposed
the harsher punishment under circumstances that allowed a possible perception of vindictiveness." 7 In applying the Pearcerule to prohibit the enhanced
109. Id. at 669.
110. Id.
111.Id. at 667-68; see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (Wasman court stated that
trial judge eliminated hazard of vindictiveness by offering reasons for enhancement of sentence
upon retrial). But see infra notes 113-18 and 132-35 (discussion of Wasman court's incorrect
application of Pearce standard).
112. 700 F.2d at 669-70.
113. Id. at 668-69; see supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (discussion of cases relied
upon by Wasman court to support refusal to apply Pearce rule to defendant's enhanced sentence).
114. See 651 F.2d at 648 (intervening conviction could not support sentence enhancement
under Pearce); 603 F.2d at 414 (intervening conviction could not support enhanced sentence after
retrial under Pearce).
115. See 700 F.2d at 667, 670 (sentencing judge discussed pending charges at original sentencing but assured defendant that judge would not consider pending charges in imposing sentence);
651 F.2d at 646 (presentence report submitted to trial judge contained information that defen.dant was under investigation for conduct which culminated in indictment and conviction for murder);
603 F.2d at 410-11 (sentencing judge at original trial knew that defendant was under indiciment
in other jurisdictions).
116. 700 F.2d at 669; see also supranote I (presentence report contains information concerning defendant's suspected criminal activity and charges not yet adjudicated).
117. See 651 F.2d at 648 (risk of vindictiveness in Williams identical to that in Pearce);
603 F.2d at 414 (no conduct existed to justify imposition of enhanced sentence under Pearce).
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sentences, both the Markus and Williams courts applied the analysis suggested

by the Supreme Court in Pearce and later cases to determine if a realistic
8
likelihood of vindictiveness existed."
The Wasman court, in contrast, failed to analyze the facts of the Wasman

case using the Supreme Court's rule in Pearce.A close examination of Pearce
and the subsequent cases interpreting the Pearcerule reveals several elements

analyzed by the Supreme Court in assessing whether a likelihood of vindictiveness exists. In Pearce, the same court that originally sentenced the defen-

dant imposed the enhanced sentence on retrial.' 9 The Supreme Court in later
cases recognized the possible existence of two motives for vindictive sentencing when the same court imposed both sentences.' 20 First, the Court
acknowledged that the resentencing court was likely to have had knowledge
of the original trial and its outcome as well as the sentence imposed.' 2 ,
Awareness of the prior sentence was, in the Court's view, the first prerequisite
for the imposition of a retaliatory penalty.2 2 Second, the Court has observed
that when the same court imposes a harsher sentence after reversal and retrial,
the second sentence is more likely to appear vindictive because the appeal has
resulted in a finding of error committed by the court.' 23 In further interpreting
Pearce, the Court has recognized that a judge, as an officer of the judicial
system, may have an institutional interest in discouraging what the judge
perceives as meritless appeals when asked to retry a previously adjudicated
case.' 24 The Supreme Court has refused to apply the Pearcerule when a dif118. See 651 F.2d at 646, 648 (Williams court applied Pearce standards to ensure that no
possibility of vindictiveness resulted in enhanced sentence); 603 F.2d at 412, 414 (Markus court
applied Pearcestandards to remove every apprehension of retaliatory motivation in resentencing
procedure); see also infra notes 113-18 (discussion of resentencing procedures Supreme Court
noted to carry inherent risks of vindictiveness).
119. See Note, A "Realistic Likelihood of Vindictiveness". Due ProcessLimitations on ProsecutorialChargingDiscretion, 1981 U. ILL. L.F. 693, 694 n.9 (1981) (resentencing judge in Pearce
not judge who imposed original sentence, though both judges were members of same court).
One commentator interprets the Court's language in Pearce and later cases to mean that the
Court failed to note that a different judge imposed the enhanced sentence. Id. But cf. 395 U.S.
at 723-24 (state court violates defendant's due process by imposing enhanced sentence motivated
by vindictiveness after Pearce); see infra text accompanying notes 119-123 (discussion of inherent
risks of vindictiveness when same court imposes original sentence and subsequent sentence after
retrial). The First Circuit has focused on the possible perception of vindictiveness by the defendant when the same judge imposes both sentences. Longval v. Meachum, 651 F.2d 818, 820 (1st
Cir. 1981), vacated andremanded, 458 U.S. 1102, affd, 693 F.2d 236 (Ist Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
51 U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1983) (No. 82-1157). In Longval, the First Circuit stated that
to avoid any apprehension of vindictiveness, whenever a resentencing is necessary, a different
judge than presided at the first sentencing must impose the new sentence. Id. at 820-21.
120. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972).
121. Id.
122. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 27 (1973).
123. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 26 (1973); cf. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S.
17, 27 (1973) (no inherent vindictiveness in jury resentencing since resentencing jury did not commit error at first trial); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972) (no inherent vindictiveness in resentencing after trial de novo since no error assigned to de novo court at first trial).
124. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974) (interests of prosecutor as officer
of judicial system in discouraging appeals increases likelihood of vindictive motive in seeking
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ferent sentencing body imposes the second sentence, when the resentencing
court has no knowledge of the prior sentence, or when no institutional interests motivate the imposition of an enhanced penalty, because no inherent
risk of vindictiveness exists unless these elements are present. 25 The Wasman
court, therefore, did not apply the Pearce standard, and instead incorrectly
relied on the Supreme Court's holding that the Pearce rule did not apply to
resentencing when no inherent risk of vindictiveness existed.' 26
The Wasman court's analysis is unconvincing. Substantial procedural differences distinguish Wasman from the Supreme Court cases relied on by the
Wasman court, which held Pearceinapplicable to a trial de novo proceeding'27
and to resentencing by a jury.'28 A de novo court is substantially less likely
to know of the previous trial's outcome or the sentence imposed. 29 Similarly,
a jury hearing a case on retrial would have no knowledge of the results of
the original proceeding.' 3 Neither a retrial by a jury nor a trial de novo involves a finding of error on the part of the sentencing authority sitting in
the second proceeding.' 3' Further, a jury does not hold the same institutional
interest in discouraging appeals as a judge holds. 32 In contrast to the cases
that the Wasman court relied upon, the factors recognized in Pearce and subsequent cases as indicating a potential risk of vindictiveness were present in the
Wasman case. 33 The district court judge who imposed the enhanced sentence

enhanced sentence on retrial); cf. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 27 (1973) (no inherent
vindictiveness in jury resentencing because jury had no interest in discouraging what judge perceives
as "meritless" appeals tending to increase case load).
125. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 26-27 (1973) (no inherent vindictiveness in
jury resentencing because resentencing jury has no knowledge of prior sentence and no interest
in reducing appellate caseload by discouraging appeals); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17
(1972) (no inherent vindictiveness in resentencing after trial de novo because sentencing body
not judicial authority reversed on appeal).
126. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 28 (1973) (jury resentencing poses no inherent risk of vindictiveness); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (no inherent risk
of vindictiveness in resentencing after trial de novo); see also supranotes 64-65 (Cohenand Chaffin resentencing procedures lessen threat of vindictiveness present in resentencing by jury and
after trial de novo.).
127. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (Pearcerule inapplicable to resentencing after trial de novo); see also supra note 64 (discussion of Colten Court's reasoning).
128. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 35 (1973) (Pearcerule inapplicable to resentencing by jury); see also supra note 65 (discussion of Chaffin Court's reasoning).
129. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 118 (1972) (de novo court not likely to know of
sentence imposed in original proceeding).
130. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 26 (1973) (jury would not know of sentence
imposed in original proceeding).
131. See id. at 27 (second sentence not imposed by judicial authority reversed on appeal);
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972) (de novo trial involves no finding of error committed by lower court).
132. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 27 (1973) (resentencing jury has no interest
in discouraging appeals to lighten caseload).
133. Ste supra text accompanying notes 119-24 (enumerating factors Supreme Court held
to pose inherent risk of vindictiveness).
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on retrial was the same judge who imposed the original sentence.' 3 4 Not only

did the judge know the result and the sentence imposed at the original trial,
but the same judge also
made the erroneous evidentiary ruling that formed
135
the basis for reversal.
Although the Eleventh Circuit determined in Wasman that the district court
fulfilled the Pearce Court's requirements,'

36

the substance of the Pearce rule

37

actually remains unsatisfied.' The reversal of the sentences in Pearce was
not a result solely of the lower court's failure to record the reasons for the
enhanced sentence, as the Wasman court claimed.' 38 Rather, the PearceCourt
invalidated the enhanced sentence because the Court could not assess the lower

court's compliance with due process principles without the bases for the enhanced sentence specified on the record. 39 Specification of the reasons for
an enhanced sentence was not the end sought by the Pearce rule, but the first
step of the appellate courts' analysis to determine whether imposition of an
enhanced sentence comported with due process."'

The Markus and Williams courts completed the substantive analysis suggested by Pearce and determined that the enhanced sentences were inconsistent with due process protection.

4

The information presented to support the

enhanced sentences in Markus and Williams concerned an intervening conviction for unrelated criminal conduct that occurred prior to the imposition of
the first sentence." 2 The language of Pearce explicitly provided that only

specific, identifiable conduct on the defendant's part occurring after the first
sentencing proceeding could support an enhanced sentence upon reconviction." 3
The Williams court noted that Justice White's partial concurrence in Pearce,",
emphasized the strict limitation the Pearcerule placed on conduct that could

support an enhanced conviction.'" If the Pearce Court had intended infor134. See 700 F.2d at 663, 665 (same judge imposed sentence following jury verdict in both
Wasman cases).
135. Id. at 665; see supra note 42 (discussion of evidentiary ruling at original trial).
136. 700 F. 2d at 668.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29 (substance of Pearce rule).
138. 700 F.2d at 668 n.6.
139. 395 U.S. at 725. The PearceCourt recognized that the reviewing court's task in assessing an enhanced sentence is to determine if the sentence comports with due process. Id. If no
reasons for the enhanced sentence appear on the record, the reviewing court cannot assess the
sentencing court's actions. Id. at 726.
140. Id. at 725-26.
141. See 651 F.2d at 650-51 (conviction occurring after original sentencing proceeding cannot serve as basis for enhanced sentence after retrial under Pearce);603 F.2d at 414 (intervening
conviction based upon indictment pending at time of original sentencing cannot support enhanced
sentence under Pearce).
142. 651 F.2d at 650-51; 603 F.2d at 414.
143. 395 U.S. at 726.
144. See id. at 751 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's partial concurrence in Pearce
maintained that any factual information not known to the trial judge at the time of original
sentencing should support an enhanced sentence after reconviction. Id.
145. See 651 F.2d at 648 n.3; see also United States v. Lopez, 428 F.2d 1135, 1139 (2d
Cir. 1970) (increase in defendant's known financial worth insufficient conduct to support enhanced
fine on resentencing under Pearcemajority rule but would have satisfied Justice White's standard
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mation other than that pertaining to conduct on the defendant's part occurring after the original sentencing to be a valid basis for an enhanced sentence,
Justice White's partial concurrence would have been unnecessary. 41 6 Both the
Williams and Markus courts reasoned that an intervening conviction for conduct predating the original sentencing could not satisfy the Pearcerequirements,
since the defendant's conduct occurred before the court imposed the first
sentence." 7 In contrast to the Markus and Williams courts' analyses, the
Wasman court noted that the district court presented reasons to support the
imposition of the enhanced sentence, but failed to scrutinize those reasons
for compliance with the Pearce standard.' 48 In Wasman, as in Markus and
Williams, the intervening conviction did not constitute conducd on the defendant's part occurring after the original sentencing.' 49 The Eleventh Circuit in
Wasman thus allowed an enhanced sentence imposed on reconviction to stand
even though the factual basis for an enhanced sentence required by Pearce
did not exist.'5 0
Further, the Wasman decision falls to implement the Pearce Court's objective of eliminating defendants' apprehension of vindictiveness. '' The Pearce
rule restricts the bases for an enhanced sentence to conduct occurring after
the first conviction.I' 2 Policy considerations support allowing sentencing judges
to impose a second enhanced sentence if a defendant has engaged in criminal
conduct after the first conviction."' One goal of sentencing and punishment
is deterrence.""5 If the first sentence falls to deter the defendant from subseas information unknown to trial court at time of original sentencing). In Wasman, the court
rejected the defendant's contention that Justice White's concurrence addressed the issue of whether
an intervening conviction could support an enhanced sentence after reconviction. 700 F.2d at
669-70 n.8. The Wasman court noted that Pearce did not address the question of whether an
intervening conviction could support an enhanced sentence. Id. The Wasman Court declined to
speculate what type of conduct Justice White's concurrence may have included. Id.
146. See 651 F.2d at 648 n.3.
147. See id. at 648 (intervening conviction may not satisfy Pearcerequirement since criminal
conduct underlying conviction occurred before original sentencing proceeding); 603 F.2d at 414
(intervening conviction based upon conduct predating original sentencing cannot support enhanced
sentence under Pearce).
148. See 700 F.2d at 667. (Wasman court noted that trial judge included reasons for enhanced sentence on record).
149. Compare id. at 666-67 (court permitted imposition of enhanced sentence based upon
intervening conviction for conduct predating original sentencing proceeding) with 651 F.2d at
648 (intervening conviction may not support enhanced sentence under Pearce since criminal conduct underlying conviction occurred before original sentencing proceeding) and 603 F.2d at 414
(intervening conviction based upon conduct predating original sentencing cannot support enhanced
sentence under Pearce).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29 (Pearcerule requires that enhanced sentence
be based on specific conduct on defendant's part occurring after original sentencing).
151. 395 U.S. at 725.
152. Id. at 726.
153. See Sentence Increases, supra note 6, at 449 (sentence enhancement upon reconviction
may deter criminal conduct if based on defendant's actions after imposition of original punishment).
154. See United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836, 845 (1968) (deterrence of criminal conduct
valid goal of sentencing policy allowing imposition of enhanced sentences after reconviction);
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quent criminal conduct, an enhanced sentence on retrial may be more
effective.' 55 If the conduct occurred before the first sentencing, however, an
enhanced sentence upon retrial has no additional deterrent effect.' 5 6 In
Wasman, for example, the enhanced sentence could not deter the criminal
conduct that resulted in Wasman's conviction for mail fraud since that conduct had occurred prior to the original sentencing proceeding.' 57 Similarly,
if the defendant's conduct subsequent to the first sentencing can support an
increased punishment on retrial, the defendant retains the means to protect
himself from an increased sentence.I 8 Unless the valid bases for an enhanced
sentence are solely within the defendant's control, the apprehension of vindictiveness that Pearce sought to eliminate will remain."9
One policy consideration supports the Eleventh Circuit's holding. Although
sentencing is a prerogative of the judge, 6 ' and the sentencing judge may con-

sider information other than prior convictions,' 6 ' allowing pending charges
to be an aggravating circumstance increasing a defendant's sentence contradicts

the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. 2 Removing intervening convictions from factors legitimately considered in imposing sentence might tend
to increase judges' reliance on pending charges as aggravating factors.' 63 Courts
must balance the need to predicate an offender's punishment on pending
charges against the potential chilling effect that a perception of vindictive
resentencing could have upon a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal.
see also Sentence Increases, supra note 6, at 449 (sentence enhancement based on criminal conduct subsequent to original sentence may serve valid deterrent purpose).
155. United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836, 845 (1968).
156. See Sentence Increases,supranote 6, at 449 (threat of sentence enhancement after reconviction can only deter criminal conduct occurring after original conviction).
157. See 700 F.2d at 667 (Wasman's conduct leading to intervening conviction occurred before
original sentencing for violation of passport statute).
158. Id.
159. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974) (removal of court's ability to implement retaliatory sentence eliminated defendants' apprehension of receiving harsher penalty for
exercising right to appeal).
160. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (judges have wide discretion in sentencing
decisions).
161. See id. (presentence investigation report provides sentencing judge with wide range of
information concerning defendant's past conduct).
162. See 700 F.2d at 668 n.5 (Wasman court noted that concept of innocent until proven
guilty means courts should not punish defendants for conduct not established by adjudication).
163. Id. at 669. The Wasman court considered whether limiting the valid bases for sentence
enhancement to conduct occurring before the original sentence would increase the sentencing
authority's reliance on pending charges in assessing punishment. Id.The Eleventh Circuit observed
that either courts must consider pending charges in setting sentences, or courts must exclude totally
the predated offense from consideration. Id. The Wasman court stated that courts should not
impose punishment based upon a mere accusation that a defendant engaged in criminal conduct.
Id. at 668 n.5. The only other alternative that the Wasman court addressed was exclusion of
predated offenses from consideration at any time. Id. at 669. The Wasman court concluded that
adoption of a policy not to consider offenses committed prior to the original sentencing needlessly
would remove valid information from the sentencing decision. Id. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
held that a sentencing court may consider intervening convictions for conduct predating a defendant's original sentencing in imposing a sentence following reconviction. Id. at 669-70.
One proposed standard for determining what conduct will permit a higher sentence consis-
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The Supreme Court has recognized that constitutional guarantees of due
process of law must extend to procedural protections in the sentencing phase
of a criminal trial.'6 Accordingly, the Pearce Court formulated a prophylactic rule designed to preserve due process standards in sentencing by ensuring that any defendant who chooses to appeal a conviction need not fear the
imposition of a harsher sentence if reconvicted in retaliation for exercising
the defendant's right to appeal. 65 The Pearce rule furthers the objective of
criminal sanctions by allowing an increased sentence upon reconviction if the
defendant's conduct after his or her original conviction warrants additional
punishment. 66 The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Wasman is inconsistent with
decisions in other circuits, which hold that proper application of Pearcemandates that a conviction for conduct occurring before imposition of the original
sentence cannot support an enhanced sentence upon reconviction.' 67 The fundamental principle of the Court's decision in Pearce was that fear of vindictive resentencing created an unconstitutional deterrent to defendants' exercise
of the right to appeal. 68 By refusing to uphold the imposition of enhanced
sentences, the Markus and Williams courts applied Pearcecorrectly to ensure
that defendants need not fear a vindictively enhanced sentence following reconviction. In contrast, the circumstances surrounding the imposition of Wasman's
enhanced sentence were conducive to a perception of vindictiveness, yet the
tent with Pearce favors allowing sentence enhancement based on criminal conduct occurring after
the original sentence with a determination of probable cause sufficient to establish that conduct.
Sentence Increases, supra note 6, at 449. Requiring a finding of probable cause would eliminate
consideration of investigative reports or suspicion of criminal activity, but would not eliminate
consideration of indictments, prosecution, or conviction. Id. Under the proposed standard, the
trial court in Wasman could have considered Wasman's charges for possession of the counterfeit
certificates of deposit when the court imposed the original sentence, but not when the court imposed the enhanced sentence. See supra text accompanying notes 149-54 (enhanced sentence following reconviction may serve valid deterrent purpose if imposed to penalize defendant's criminal
conduct occurring after original conviction and sentencing).
164. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (due process protections apply to sentencing
phase of trial process).
165. See supra note 5-8 & 23-29 and accompanying text (Pearce rule designed to eliminate
defendant's apprehension of vindictive resentencing after successful challenge to prior conviction).
166. See supra notes 32, 149-51 and accompanying text (enhanced sentences imposed after
reconviction permissible under Pearceto deter criminal conduct subsequent to original proceeding);
see also 395 U.S. at 726 (Pearce rule allows enhanced sentence following reconviction if based
upon specific conduct on defendant's part occurring after imposition of original sentence).
167. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text (Wasman court affirmed trial court's
imposition of enhanced sentence based on intervening conviction for conduct predating original
sentencing as consistent with Pearce); supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (Markus court
held that intervening conviction for conduct predating original sentencing could not support enhanced sentence after reconviction under Pearce);supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text
(Williams court held that intervening conviction could not support enhanced sentence after reconviction under Pearce).
168. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (Pearcerule designed to eliminate potential chilling effect perception of vindictiveness might have upon defendant's exercise of right to
appeal); supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text (Markusand Williams holdings implement
objective of Pearce rule by eliminating defendants' apprehension of vindictive resentencing as
penalty for challenges to original convictions).
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Wasman court declined to apply the Pearcestandard to the lower court's decision to increase the defendant's punishment after retrial."l 9 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Wasman fails to implement the PearceCourt's objective
of eliminating every apprehension of vindictive sentencing by a criminal trial
judge. Consequently, appellate courts faced with enhanced sentences upon

retrial should reject the Wasman holding and instead should follow the Markus
and Williams courts' application of the Pearce guidelines.
MEREDITH SUSAN PALMER

169. See supra notes 112-33 and accompanying text (Wasman court refused to apply Pearce
rule to defendant's enhanced sentence and instead relied upon holdings of cases in which no
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness existed); notes 134-46 and accompanying text (no conduct
on defendant's part existed in Wasman to support enhanced sentence under Pearce).

